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Introduction
In the fall of 2016, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) announced that Wesley College had violated Title IX of the 1972 
Education Amendments when it mistreated a student accused of sexual 
assault.1 According to the OCR, four male students at the Delaware college 
were accused of livestreaming a fellow student having sex, without her consent. 
One of those students never received information from the school about the 
accusation or the available evidence. He was invited to attend an informal 
educational meeting only to discover the “chat” was in fact a disciplinary 
hearing.
Casual observers may have been surprised to hear the Education 
Department stood up for an alleged assailant. A popular public narrative 
suggests that advocates for victims’ rights and for accused students are locked 
in an intractable conflict, with the Obama presidency favoring the former 
and the Trump presidency sure to switch teams. The story is wrong—and that 
matters for all students.
The decades-old movement to end campus gender violence achieved 
unprecedented attention and power during the course of Barack Obama’s 
presidency. Student organizers, many of whom publicly identify as survivors, 
used a combination of legal complaints, public protest, and powerful narratives 
to pressure their schools—often successfully—to change their approach to 
1. Letter to Robert E. Clark II, President of Wesley College from Beth Gellman-Beer, U.S. Dep’t of eDUc. 
(Oct. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Letter to Robert E. Clark II], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/
list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/03152329-a.pdf.
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sexual violence reports.2 The Obama OCR, under the leadership of Russlynn 
Ali and then Catherine Lhamon, issued new guidance clarifying schools’ 
responsibilities to address gender violence3 and commenced a rigorous 
enforcement campaign.4 Decades after an appellate court first held that the sex 
discrimination law Title IX requires schools to address allegations of sexual 
harassment,5 many colleges undertook serious reform efforts, recognizing the 
legal and reputational threat of their own noncompliance with civil rights law 
for the first time.
Many of these changes included new disciplinary procedures informed by 
OCR’s key 2011 guidance, commonly known as the “Dear Colleague Letter.”6 
While far from satisfied, many survivors and their allies reported significant 
improvements as a result.7 Yet a counternarrative emerged from some law 
professors, reporters, libertarians critical of the administrative state, and those 
skeptical of the existence of campus rape8: that schools, in their attempts to 
conform to the Department of Education’s nonbinding recommendations, 
were now violating the rights of students accused of gender violence.9 Where 
2. See, e.g., Libby Sander, Quiet No Longer, Rape Survivors Put Pressure on Colleges, chron. higher 
eDUc. (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Quiet-No-Longer-Rape/141049 
(describing a range of student survivors’ strategies). 
3. U.S. Dep’t of eDUc., QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX anD SeXUal Violence (Apr. 
29, 2014) [hereinafter QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX], http://www2.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Robin Wilson, 2014 Influence List: Enforcer, chron. higher eDUc. (Dec. 15, 2014), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/enforcer-catherine-e-lhamon/150837 (describing Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights’ Catherine Lhamon’s efforts to strengthen OCR’s Title IX 
enforcement).
5. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 181-83 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. U.S. Dep’t of eDUc., Dear colleagUe letter (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear colleagUe 
letter], https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf.
7. See, e.g., Letter from the National Women’s Law Center et al. to Education Secretary John King, nat’l 
women’S l. ctr. (July 13, 2016), https://nwlc.org/resources/sign-on-letter-supporting-title-
ix-guidance-enforcement/ (“These guidance documents and increased enforcement of Title 
IX by the Office for Civil Rights have spurred schools to address cultures that for too long 
have contributed to hostile environments which deprive many students of equal educational 
opportunities.”).
8. The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), an influential critic of OCR’s 
Title IX enforcement, has criticized the agency’s guidance for alleged violations of the 
Administrative Procedures Act. Ari Cohn, Did the Office for Civil Rights’ April 4 ‘Dear Colleague’ 
Letter Violate the Law? foUnD. inDiViDUal rtS. eDUc. (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.thefire.
org/did-the-office-for-civil-rights-april-4-dear-colleague-letter-violate-the-law/ (“It is our 
conclusion that in issuing this mandate, OCR failed to comply with the required APA 
procedures, and has robbed the public of its opportunity and duty to participate in the 
rulemaking process.”). FIRE claims the illegal guidance is premised on a “highly inflated 
notion of an ‘epidemic’ of campus rape.” Cathy Young, The Politics of Campus Sexual Assault. 
Why is the Federal Government Pushing to Reduce the Due Process Rights of College Students?, reaSon.com 
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/11/17/the-politics-of-campus-sexual-assault. 
9. See, e.g., Joseph Cohn, et al., Open Letter to OCR from FIRE Coalition, foUnD. inDiViDUal rtS. 
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schools had once disregarded the rights of victims, they argue, now they were 
disregarding the rights of the accused10—with a disproportionate impact, some 
say, on black men.11 The pushback has found powerful advocates, including 
vocal Harvard Law professors12 and Senator John McCain.13 Lawsuits from 
students suspended or expelled for gender violence—including some who 
challenge the legality of the Dear Colleague Letter—continue to pile up in 
courts.14 While the Trump administration has, at the time of this writing, yet 
to reveal its Title IX agenda, the Republican National Convention’s platform 
and Education Secretary Betsy DeVos’s hearing suggest the new OCR may be 
heavily influenced by the backlash.
At the same time that survivors, accused students, and their allies have argued 
about sexual violence on college campuses, civil rights advocates elsewhere 
kick-started a campaign to challenge disciplinary practices in K-12 schools that 
push kids, and particularly kids of color, out of the classroom. Data published 
by OCR showed staggering rates of exclusion for black children as young as 
preschoolers and significant racial gaps, with black girls five and a half times 
more likely than their white female classmates to be suspended.15 Much of the 
eDUc. (May 7, 2012), https://www.thefire.org/open-letter-to-ocr-from-fire-coalition/; Isaac 
Arnsdorf, ACE, FIRE on Campus Sexual Assault, politico (Feb. 25, 2016, 2:00 PM EST), 
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/politico-influence/2016/02/ace-fire-on-campus-sexual-
assault-212896/; Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Op-Ed: Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 
BoSton gloBe (Oct. 15, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-
harvard-sexual-harassment-policy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html.
10. See, e.g., David G. Savage & Timothy M. Phelps, How a Little-Known Education Office Has Forced 
Far-Reaching Changes to Campus Sex Assault Investigations, l.a. timeS (Aug. 17, 2015, 3:00 AM) 
(quoting Janet Halley saying “I’m afraid that’s what we are doing, we are over-correcting . . 
. . The procedures that are being adopted are taking us back to pre-Magna Carta, pre-due-
process procedures.”). 
11. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 128 harV. l. reV. 
F. 103 (Feb. 18, 2015). 
12. Bartholet et al., supra note 9.
13. Senator John McCain Sends Letters to DOJ and EPA on Obama Administration Settlement Abuse, John 
mccain (June 26, 2013), http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/6/
post-818fd6f0-b009-240c-b963-7b7bb47f03fb.
14. See, e.g., Neal v. Colo. State Univ.-Pueblo, No. 16-CV-873-RM-CBS, 2017 WL 633045 (D. 
Colo. Feb. 16, 2017); Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., No. 9:16-CV-80850, 2017 WL 237631 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 19, 2017); Ritter v. Oklahoma City Univ., No. CIV-16-0438-HE, 2016 WL 3982554 (W.D. 
Okla. July 22, 2016); Doe I v. Cummins, 662 F. App’x 437 (6th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Columbia 
Univ., No. 15-1536, 2016 WL 4056034 (2d. Cir. July, 2016); Doe v. Brown Univ., No. CV 16-
017 S, 2016 WL 5409241 (D.R.I. Sept. 28, 2016); Doe v. Univ. S. Cal., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d 851 
(Ct. App. Cal. 2016); Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:15-cv-600, 2015 WL 5729328 (S.D. 
Ohio. Sept. 30, 2015).
15. U.S. Dept. of Educ., Civil Rights Data Collection Data Snapshot: School Discipline, 
office for ciVil rightS (March 2014), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-school-
discipline-snapshot.pdf.
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push for better discipline practices has focused on the need for educators to 
better respond to students’ trauma—including sexual trauma at school.16 
In this broader fight for fairer school discipline, efforts to address 
sexual harassment and efforts to protect accused students’ time in class are 
understood to be part of the same project to increase educational access. Yet in 
the narrower college rape context, many advocates and most popular accounts 
tell a tale of warring interests. Schools can either prevent and respond to 
gender violence or protect accused students’ rights; these aims are imagined 
to be entirely mutually exclusive.17 Many Title IX opponents deploy a rhetoric 
of “overcorrection” and a pendulum swinging too far, as though a single axis 
of justice exists on which every gain for one side is a loss for the other.18 And, 
while this article will resist false equivalencies between political factions, 
some victims’ advocates have resisted calls to protect accused students’ rights 
as attempts to return to an earlier age of impunity on campus. When then-
nominee for secretary of education Betsy DeVos noted, in her hearing, that her 
department must consider the effect of Title IX guidance on both victims and 
alleged perpetrators19—which it undoubtedly must—some took this as evidence 
of her hostility to sexual harassment protections.20 This narrative of warring 
interests ignores the unifying principle that motivates both those who labor 
to end sexual abuses and those who work in good faith to ensure adequate 
protections for students engaged in disciplinary hearings: the need to combat 
16. See, e.g., national women’S law center anD naacp legal DefenSe & eDUcational 
fUnD, Unlocking opportUnity for african american girlS: a call to action for 
eDUcational eQUity (2014), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/unlocking_
opportunity_for_african_american_girls_final.pdf. 
17. See, e.g., Zoë Heller, Rape on Campus, n.y. reV. of BookS (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/2015/02/05/rape-campus (describing a clash between due-process advocates 
and rape victim advocates).
18. See, e.g., Savage & Phelps, supra note 10; Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, Slate 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_
campus_sexual_assault_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html; Robby Soave, As 
the Campus Rape Narrative Unravels, Will Due Process Strike Back in 2015?, reaSon (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://reason.com/archives/2014/12/30/campus-rape-narrative-and-due-process (quoting 
Justin Dillon, counsel for students accused of rape, saying “The Department of Education 
has made clear that it doesn’t really care about due process, which means colleges won’t 
either—until they start having to pay out large damage awards to wrongly convicted students 
. . . . The more that happens, the more likely you are to see the pendulum start swinging 
back to a sensible middle.”).
19. fUll committee hearing, nomination of BetSy DeVoS to SerVe aS 
Secretary of eDUcation (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/
nomination-of-betsy-devos-to-serve-as-secretary-of-education.
20. To be sure, this hostility is real, given DeVos’s general rejection of a federal role in 
enforcing civil rights. There is more than enough evidence apart from her reasonable 
concern for the effect of Title IX guidance on students accused of sexual violence. 
See, e.g., Lauren Camera, DeVos: I’d be Fine Ditching the Education Department, U.S. newS & 
worlD rep. (Feb. 17, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2017-02-17/
betsy-devos-id-be-fine-if-we-could-ditch-the-education-department.
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unjust deprivations of the right to learn, whether the threat is unaddressed 
gender violence or, less frequently, false accusations. 
The caveat of “good faith” is necessary because, as this article will detail, 
some of the loudest voices decrying the treatment of students accused of gender 
violence appear deeply unconcerned with victims’ educations, having rooted 
their campaign in misogyny and misinformation about sexual assault. Not all 
have done so, though, and the disingenuous posturing of some advocates is 
no reason to doubt that schools do, in fact, treat some alleged sexual assailants 
unfairly. After all, no one knows better than student survivors that schools have 
long mishandled disciplinary complaints. Without a doubt, the allegations 
made by some accused students in their lawsuits against schools are, if true, 
deeply disturbing. Further, while there are no available data reflecting rates of 
disciplinary action for different racial and ethnic groups on college campuses, 
and while some who have speculated about racially disparate impacts of new 
campus rape policies have overlooked women of color who are subject to 
high rates of sexual victimization and reified stereotypes of “deviant” black 
masculinity,21 racially biased sanctions would be unsurprising given both K-12 
data and America’s long history of knee-jerk, overly punitive responses to 
black men accused of raping white women. 
This article takes as a given, then, that concerns about colleges’ treatment 
of student gender violence victims and their alleged assailants are both valid 
without making a claim of equivalency. The intervention attempted here is 
to demonstrate the necessity of reconceptualizing the relationship between 
the two interests as deeply interconnected rather than as merely locked in 
incurable conflict, to diagnose the roots of the “warring factions” narrative, and 
to describe what is lost for all students due to this misguided approach. While 
Trump, the self-professed “pussy grabber,” gives us little reason for optimism, 
young people will unquestionably be better-served by an administration that 
does not believe its task is to choose to stand either with rape victims or with 
accused men.
In Part I, I explore the overlooked common ground between efforts to 
address gender violence on college campuses and to protect the rights of 
accused students in disciplinary procedures. The two opposing camps, as 
they are styled, share ethical and political values, a strategic interest in the 
actual and perceived fairness of school proceedings, and benefit under new 
laws and regulations regarding campus gender violence. In Part II, I consider 
the foundation of the exaggerated conflict: rape exceptionalism, bolstered by 
the dominance of criminal law in the public’s conception of gender violence. 
21. Antuan M. Johnson, Note, Title IX Narratives, Intersectionality, and Male-Biased Conceptions of 
Racism, 9 geo. J.l. & moD. crit. race perSp. 57, 63-73 (2017); Kamilah Willingham, To 
the Harvard 19: Do Better (Mar. 14, 2016), https://medium.com/@kamily/to-the-harvard-law-
19-do-better-1353794288f2#.tgc0ny5uo (“[Y]ou’ve speculated without evidence that Black 
men are disproportionately accused of sexual assault in schools, while turning a blind eye to 
well-established research on the disproportionate rate at which women of color are subjected to 
sexual assault. If you are concerned with the intersection of race and sexual assault, why not 
start there?”). 
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Part III considers the cost to students of the vilification of Title IX outside the 
context of the larger project of student discipline. The article concludes with 
some brief thoughts on a better way forward for advocates and students.
1.  Overlooked common ground
Designing any system of antagonistic adjudication requires careful 
balancing of the parties’ interests. Student disciplinary procedures are no 
exception. It would be Pollyannaish, then, to reject the public narrative of 
intractable conflict for one of perfect harmony, pretending the interests of 
survivors and accused students are entirely reconcilable. To put it simply: 
Many survivors want their assailants sanctioned, and presumably all accused 
students want not to be sanctioned. Yet despite this obvious tension, advocates 
for both parties share common values, strategic ends, and benefits under the 
new legal regime.
A.  Shared values
The narrative of warring interests ignores the unifying principle that 
motivates both those who labor to end sexual abuses and those who work to 
ensure adequate protections for students engaged in disciplinary hearings: the 
need to combat unjust deprivations of the right to learn, whether the threat is 
unaddressed gender violence or, less frequently, false accusations. The robust 
debate around campus discipline for sexual harassment reflects a widespread, 
deeply held recognition of the ethical importance of education, an essential 
good for individual flourishing and an equalizing force for the nation. The 
Supreme Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right to education.22 
Instead, U.S. anti-discrimination law best reflects our strong national 
commitment to preserving educational opportunities for the most vulnerable 
among us, for those who are likeliest to suffer identity-based inequity, 
harassment, and violence. Title IX provides federal rights for students and 
underscores the importance of education. Gender, of course, is not the sole 
axis of discrimination prohibited in education. Like Title IX, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196423 (dealing with discrimination based on ethnicity or 
national origin) and both Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act24 
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197325 (together dealing with 
discrimination based on disability) require schools to ensure that all students, 
regardless of identity, have equal opportunities to learn and thrive, free from 
the imposition of identity-based limitations.26 These anti-discrimination laws 
are based on a recognition that the deprivation of education not only limits 
an individual’s intellectual and professional life but also blocks an essential 
22. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (2016).
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2016).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2016).
26. See Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6. 
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gateway to participation in public life—one historically limited for women, 
people of color, and people with disabilities.27 Thus, Title IX guarantees 
protections to student survivors of gender violence because such violence 
creates an unconscionable sex-based obstacle to the pursuit of an education. 
These education anti-discrimination laws, because they place such weight 
on a students’ opportunity to learn, are significant far beyond the domain of 
discrimination, underscoring the great loss a suspension or expulsion imposes 
on a student. Of course, students do not, by operation of federal civil rights 
law, have the legal right to attend a given school. Yet anti-discrimination laws 
that recognize the importance of education make clear that suspensions and 
expulsions—whatever the motivation—are weighty burdens that threaten not 
only career prospects28 but also access to the inherently valuable chance to 
learn. Additionally, while discipline is often necessary to promote equality, for 
instance, when a student threatens the civil rights of others, it can also be 
used to thwart social progress. Tellingly, the student parties to the two most 
influential discipline cases, Goss v. Lopez and the Fifth Circuit’s Dixon v. Alabama 
State Board of Education,29 were sanctioned for protesting racial injustice in the 
American South. Flimsy protections create room for discrimination that has 
devastating consequences for marginalized students.
No one should be surprised, then, that anti-rape and fair-process advocates 
share core commitments—and are often the same people. In April 2015, six 
student anti-violence organizations signed on to an open letter written by 
Know Your IX (which, in full disclosure, I co-founded and previously co-
directed) about the importance of procedural fairness in campus adjudication 
of sexual harassment.30 “[A]s students whose educational opportunities have 
been imperiled and limited by violence,” the groups explained, “we understand 
too well the harm of unjust deprivations of the right to learn.”31
B.  Shared strategic ends
Apart from common ethical commitments, both advocates for accused 
students and advocates for student victims of gender violence benefit 
strategically from fair, equitable procedures.  Attorneys who represent students 
on both side of accusations can attest  to their  frustrations when schools violate 
the rights of the opposing party, leading to internal appeals and subsequent 
litigation that extends the painful process for their clients. Students are left 
in limbo for months or even years, waiting to hear whether they can return 
27. See, e.g., 118 cong. rec. 5806-07 (1972).
28. Warren A. Seavey, Comment, Dismissal of Students: “Due Process,” 70 harV. l. reV. 1406, 1407 
(1957).
29. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 
1961).




to campus—either because they fear the return of their rapists or because 
they have been suspended. A student who truthfully accuses another may 
nonetheless be forced to share a campus with her abuser if the school violates 
a procedural right and, to settle litigation, allows the wrongdoer to reenroll. 
No one wins when processes are unfair. 
Further, alleged victims and accused students complain of many of the same 
procedural pitfalls, like biased boards, insufficient transparency, untrained 
staff, and poor guidance.32 Of course, one party may be pleased by bias in its 
favor and discourage any correction. Yet, on the whole, parties on both sides 
of the table seek similar, if not identical, structural reform.
Zooming out to the larger political landscape, the long-term realization of 
accused and victimized students’ interests depends on the perceived legitimacy 
of disciplinary procedures for gender violence. Accused students’ advocates 
speak openly of how colleges’ widespread failure to protect the rights of 
victimized students created political pressure to deprioritize fairness to 
accused students. In one lawsuit against Columbia University, a male student 
suspended for sexual assault claimed that the school rushed through flimsy 
procedures to find him responsible, despite insufficient evidence, because of 
negative press detailing the schools’ mistreatment of survivors.33 Regardless 
of whether the plaintiff is correct in his diagnosis, the story makes sense: if 
the public does not trust schools to take appropriate measures in response to 
students’ gender violence complaints, these same colleges may feel pressure to 
prove critics wrong, even when a particular case does not warrant a finding of 
responsibility or a severe sanction.34
Right now, the stakes are particularly high for student survivors and the 
groups mobilized on their behalf. Suits from sanctioned students continue to 
pile up35 and campus disciplinary boards are widely derided as inept “kangaroo 
courts.”36 In many critics’ misguided judgment, the obvious solution to school 
32. Compare the 2011 Title IX complaint against Yale University, of which I was a part, 
Christina Huffington, Yale Students File Title IX Complaint Against University, yale heralD (Mar. 
31, 2011, 10:19 PM), http://yaleherald.com/homepage-lead-image/cover-stories/breaking-
news-yale-students-file-title-ix-suit-against-school/, with a recent suit by a student expelled 
by Yale, Complaint and Jury Demand, Montague v. Yale Univ., No. 3:16-cv-00885 (D. Conn. 
June 9, 2016), http://www.chronicle.com/items/biz/pdf/Montague%20Complaint.pdf, and 
compare Columbia survivors’ administrative complaint against the school with a lawsuit 
brought by a suspended student, Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d. Cir. 2016).
33. Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d. Cir. 2016).
34. None of this is to say, as some critics have, that this pressure is sufficient to overcome 
millennia-old biases against survivors and women. 
35. E.g., Doe, 831 F.3d at 46; Doe v. Brown University, 166 F. Supp. 3d 177 (D.R.I. Feb. 22, 
2016); Xiaolu Peter Yu v. Vassar Coll., 97 F. Supp. 3d 448 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015). See also 
Matt Rocheleau, College Students Fight Sexual Assault Accusations, BoS. gloBe, June 27, 2014 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/06/26/students-accused-campus-sexual-assaults-
fighting-back/HiierdwFHb3o35w6oZXOJJ/story.html.
36. E.g., On Campus, a Debate Over Civil Rights and Rape, USa toDay (Apr. 21, 2012,   http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-21/title-ix-campus-sexual-violence/54456812/1 
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disciplinary failures is to cede all authority to the police. Bills to require 
“mandatory referrals” to law enforcement have been introduced in Congress37 
and states38 including Georgia,39 Rhode Island,40 Tennessee,41 Delaware,42 
Virginia,43 and Maryland.44 Gender violence survivors and advocates insist that 
these laws would decrease reporting to colleges, preclude support for victims, 
and frustrate colleges’ efforts to create an environment in which they can fulfill 
their ultimate mission: to teach.45 Legislators, deluged by stories of inadequate 
school processes, have thus far been hesitant to hear these warnings.46
Fair disciplinary procedures, then, will promote not only just outcomes but 
also the public faith necessary to empower administrators to ensure productive 
educational environments. The robust literature on procedural justice has 
(“But when Warner returned to school, an administrator pulled him from class. He’d been 
accused of rape, and he would have to face charges in the campus disciplinary system . . . . 
What followed, as Warner and his mother describe it, was a ‘kangaroo court’ campus trial 
. . . .”). Some victims, too, characterize school disciplinary hearings this way. Nancy Chi 
Cantalupo, Campus Violence: Understanding the Extraordinary Through the Ordinary, 35 J.C. & U.L. 
613, 624 (2009).
37. Safe Campus Act of 2015, H.R. 3403, 114 Cong. § 2(a) (2015) (amending Title I of the Higher 
Education Act of 1965) (unenacted).
38. See generally anDrew morSe, Brian a. SponSler & mary fUlton, State legiSlatiVe 
DeVelopmentS on campUS SeXUal Violence: iSSUeS in the conteXt of Safety 5 (Dec. 
15, 2015), https://www.naspa.org/images/uploads/main/ECS_NASPA_BRIEF_
DOWNLOAD3.pdf (reporting eleven state proposals).
39. H.B. 51, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2017).
40. H.B. 5034, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2015).
41. S.B. 2019, 109th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5(a) (Tenn. 2016), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
Bills/109/Bill/SB2019.pdf. 
42. H. Substitute 1 for H.B. 1, 148th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2016) (enacted but not effective until 
June 30, 2017), https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail?legislationId=24165. 
43. Va. coDe ann. § 23.1-806 (2016).
44. H.B. 749, S.B. 817, S.B. 578, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2015).
45. For critiques of mandatory referral bills, see Alexandra Brodsky, Against Taking Rape “Seriously”: 
The Case Against Mandatory Referral Laws for Campus Gender Violence, harV. c.r.-c.l. l. reV. 
(forthcoming); Tyler Kingkade, 28 Groups that Work with Rape Victims Think the Safe Campus 
Act is Terrible, hUffington poSt (Sept. 13, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/entry/rape-victims-safe-campusact_us_55f300cce4b063ecbfa4150b; Andrew Morse, 
An Open Letter on Campus Sexual Assault to Elected Leaders in all 50 States, naSpa (Feb. 19, 2015), 
https://www.naspa.org/rpi/posts/open-letter-on-campus-sexual-assault; Resisting State-Level 
Mandatory Police Referral Efforts, know yoUr iX, http://knowyourix.org/mandatory-referral 
(last visited May 23, 2017); Jill Filipovic, Making it Harder to Punish Campus Rapists Won’t 
Help Stop Campus Rape, waSh. poSt (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2015/08/10/making-it-harder-to-punish-campus-rapists-wont-help-stop-
campus-rape/; Dana Bolger & Alexandra Brodsky, Victim’s Choice, Not Police Involvement, Should 
Be Lawmakers’ Priority, MSNBC (Feb. 12, 2015, 6:49 AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/
campus-rape-victims-choice-should-be-lawmakers-priority.
46. Brodsky, supra note 45 (tracking introduction of mandatory referral bills and legislators’ 
responses to critics).
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demonstrated the importance of fair process to participants’ acceptance of 
decision-makers’ authority and decisions—both in formal legal disputes and 
informal resolutions47—regardless of whether the outcome is favorable to their 
interests.48 Just as fair criminal procedures encourage people to “buy in” to 
legal systems and “adhere to agreements and follow rules over time,”49 ethical 
and equitable campus disciplinary procedures will likely improve student 
participants’ trust in hearing boards and acceptance of their decisions. Over 
time, fair procedures should lead to greater community faith in campus 
discipline, allowing colleges to take the steps necessary to build safe and just 
campuses. All students, victims and respondents alike, will then benefit from 
meaningful protections for the opposing party.
C.  Shared benefit under new legal regime
Many critics have painted recent survivor-protective efforts by the 
Department of Education, tasked with enforcing Title IX, as an attack on 
accused students’ rights. Other writers have helpfully demonstrated that Title 
IX’s requirements do not conflict with procedural requirements.50 Yet Title 
IX guidance and the Campus SaVE Act51 are not merely compatible with due 
process but provide more robust procedural protections for both parties than 
does the Constitution—or any other federal law or regulation. 
The Constitution provides very few protections to accused students. As a 
general matter, students at private schools have no procedural due-process 
rights; the fairness of  their schools’ disciplinary processes is a matter of contract, 
and disciplinarians need only conform to their written policies.52 Public school 
students fair better, but not by much. In its most famous student due-process 
case, Goss v. Lopez, the Court held that a public school respondent facing a 
suspension has a protected property interest in her continued education but, 
procedurally, is owed only “some kind of notice and afforded some kind of 
47. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: 
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DiSp. reSol. 1 (2011) (demonstrating 
the importance of procedural justice in alternative dispute resolution).
48. Id. at 4.
49. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 crime & JUSt. 283, 286 
(2003).
50. E.g., Nancy Chi Cantalupo, “Decriminalizing” Campus Institutional Responses to Peer Sexual Violence, 
38 J.C. & U.L. 481, 512 (2012); Holly Hogan, The Real Choice in a Perceived “Catch-22”: Providing 
Fairness to Both the Accused and Complaining Students in College Sexual Assault Disciplinary Proceedings, 38 
J.l. & eDUc. 277 (2009).
51. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 
89 (2013) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2016)).
52. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (following “the well-settled 
rule that the relations between a student and a private university are a matter of contract”). 
Some courts, however, have reviewed private universities decisions for arbitrariness and 
capriciousness. Cantalupo, supra note 50, at 514. 
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hearing.”53 While Goss suggested schools might need to provide more formal 
procedures when serious sanctions are on the line, subsequent Courts have 
largely avoided further instructions to this effect.54 
Title IX and the recently amended Jeanne Clery Act,55 the two primary laws 
shaping colleges and universities’ responses to gender violence, present a more 
robust vision of fair process on campus than does the Constitution. Increased 
requirements for notice, access to the record, guidance, and appellate review 
are particularly robust. 
Notice
In December 2014, Slate writer Emily Yoffe introduced readers to an unlikely 
protagonist: Drew Sterrett, a former University of Michigan student expelled for 
rape. According to Sterrett, who insists he was wrongly accused, administrators 
first questioned him about a sexual encounter before he knew he had been 
accused of assault.56 Without proper notice, he was unable to consult a lawyer 
or appreciate the repercussions of his answers. Whether or not the story is true, 
Yoffe’s account highlights the importance of notice to campus discipline.57 
Thankfully, though the Constitution requires few procedural protections for 
accused students at state schools, and none at all at private colleges, it does 
require notice.58 Yet what constitutes sufficient notice is unclear: Goss requires 
only “some kind of notice.”59 The 1975 Goss Court held that, in student discipline, 
“[t]here need be no delay between the time ‘notice’ is given and the time of 
the hearing.”60 Some lower courts, however, have required such an interval. 
The District of New Hampshire, for example, required that a public school 
student facing a suspension longer than five days be provided “sufficient time 
to prepare a defense or reply” between notice and a hearing.”61 In Jenkins, the 
53. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (emphasis added).
54. James M. Picozzi, University Disciplinary Process: What’s Fair, What’s Due, and What You Don’t Get, 96 
yale l.J. 2132, 2133-34 (1987) (“While the Supreme Court equivocated, the lack of a national 
procedural standard spawned litigation... the lower federal courts did not equivocate… 
they found public university students do hold property and liberty interests… Yet, without 
a ruling by the Supreme Court specifying how much process a student was due, the district 
courts applied Goss unevenly.”).
55. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 127 Stat. 89 (2013) (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2016)).
56. Yoffe, supra note 18.
57. Although Sterrett’s story is compelling, it is important to note that no court has yet made 
a factual finding about whether his account is true. I would also be remiss to cite to the 
story without noting that I dispute Yoffe’s characterization of national response to campus 
gender-based violence as an “overcorrection,” which feeds the narrative of incompatible 
feminist and due-process interests. See Yoffe, supra note 18. 
58. Goss, 419 U.S. at 740 (“student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him….”).
59. Id. at 579.
60. Id. at 582.
61. Vail v. Bd. of Ed. of Portsmouth Sch. Dist., 354 F. Supp. 592, 603 (D.N.H.), vacated and 
833
Fifth Circuit did not specify a minimum delay between notice and a hearing, 
but noted that the two weeks between a student’s notice of charges and the 
hearing was sufficient.62 
OCR, though, requires that notice to both students should go beyond 
the bare constitutional minimum and include timely communication of 
the accusation. The Obama OCR’s resolution of the Wesley case indicates 
it believed more than a week was necessary63—far longer than that required 
by Goss. Further, a timeliness requirement follows from OCR’s separate 
requirement that “the parties must have an equal opportunity to present 
relevant witnesses and other evidence [and t]he complainant and the alleged 
perpetrator must be afforded similar and timely access to any information that 
will be used at the hearing.”64 Without timely notice, a respondent would be at 
a severe disadvantage in preparation, as the alleged victim would know of the 
charges well before his or her opposing party. 
It is worth noting that OCR’s explicit requirement that schools provide 
immediate services to reporting victims, such as moving one of the parties out 
of a shared dorm, does not contradict or undermine its implicit requirement 
that schools delay a hearing to provide both parties adequate time to prepare. 
Instead, these two requirements work hand in hand: Universities must 
provide accused students with enough time to comprehend the accusations 
brought against them, and must protect the alleged victim during this period 
through necessary accommodations. Goss noted that a hearing should precede 
a student’s suspension whenever possible,  but “[s]tudents whose presence 
poses a continuing danger to persons or property…may be immediately 
removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary 
hearing should follow as soon as practicable….”65 Similarly, the OCR instructs: 
“Title IX requires a school to protect the complainant and ensure his or her 
safety as necessary, including taking interim steps before the final outcome 
of any investigation. The school should take these steps promptly once it has 
notice of a sexual violence allegation….”66 
Despite some critics’ protests that any action before a hearing is a violation 
of due process, prehearing temporary safety measures are well-established 
outside the campus setting. For example, temporary restraining orders are 
issued before both parties have the opportunity to be heard. Further, a hearing 
is not the only form of process. The Obama OCR required at least an interview 
with the accused student before an interim suspension. In the Wesley case, 
OCR found the college had violated Title IX because the college “impos[ed] 
remanded, 502 F.2d 1159 (1st Cir. 1973).
62. Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 506 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1975).
63. Letter to Robert E. Clark II, supra note 1. 
64. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 11.
65. Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-83. 
66. QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX, supra note 3, at 3. 
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an interim suspension upon each student…[without]…giv[ing the students] 
the opportunity to show why the suspension should not be implemented…
[none] were afforded [the] opportunity.”67
Access to the Record
OCR explicitly requires that both parties be granted “access to any 
information that will be used at the hearing.”68 Lhamon’s OCR made good 
on its commitment to such transparency: In its resolution with Wesley, the 
agency devoted considerable space to failure to provide an incident report and 
investigative findings to accused students.69 Given the gap between OCR’s 
commitment and Goss’s requirement of only “some kind of notice,”70 students 
accused of a different form of misconduct at either a public or private school 
would likely have no such recourse absent a school’s contractual promise to 
provide the full record.
Yoffe’s account of procedural messes at the University of Michigan 
highlights the importance of such access. Yoffe writes:
On Nov. 9, 2012, Sterrett was given a one-page document titled “Summary of 
Witness Testimony and Review of Other Evidence.” It consisted primarily of 
summaries of statements from anonymous witnesses. For example, it stated: 
“Two witnesses stated the Complainant reported to them that she tried to 
push the Respondent off her.” ([The victim] didn’t know who these two 
witnesses were. She confirmed in her deposition that in her original statement 
to [the administrator], she never said that she had tried to push Sterrett off 
her.) It also stated: “[A] witness reported that the Respondent told them that 
he engaged in penetration with the Complainant and ‘she was saying ‘no,’ 
and that it was just—it was ‘just like a second,’ and then he stopped, and then 
the Complainant left.’” (In her deposition, [the victim] acknowledged this 
was not how their sexual encounter transpired, although she maintained that 
at some point she said “no.”).71
Deprived of reasonable access to the records on which the decision-makers 
relied, neither the complainant nor the respondent was able to address 
apparent inconsistencies. Without the witnesses’ full testimony, and without 
knowledge of their identities, neither Sterrett nor the alleged victim 
could explain why these accounts deviated from both parties’ version of the 
events: Sterrett could not explain why the witnesses may have maliciously 
misrepresented him, and the opposing party could not explain why these 
67. Letter to Robert E. Clark II, supra note 1, at 20.
68. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 11.
69. Letter to Robert E. Clark II, supra note 1.
70. See, e.g., Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Absent from Goss . . . 
was any requirement for the presentation of evidence against the accused [or] a transcript of 
the proceedings . . . .”). 
71. Yoffe, supra note 18.
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classmates, presumably friends, might have misunderstood details of her 
nonetheless truthful complaint.
The University of Michigan’s sexual misconduct policy explains:
In most cases, the Investigator will prepare a written report at the conclusion of 
an investigation. Before the report is finalized, the participating Complainant 
and Respondent will be given the opportunity to review their own statement 
and, to the extent appropriate to honor due process and privacy considerations, 
the participating Complainant and Respondent may also be provided with a 
summary of other information collected during the investigation.72
Summaries are an appealing tool to provide the parties with a general 
understanding of the evidence available without revealing potentially sensitive 
information that might endanger the participants. Yet they do not provide the 
parties with an opportunity to engage fully with the available evidence by 
pointing out inconsistencies or supplying contrary evidence. Some details, 
peripheral to the alleged misconduct, might be excluded from a summary, but 
their refutation may speak to the veracity of the account and trustworthiness 
of a witness. This nitpicking process may be distasteful, particularly when 
directed at an alleged victim: Trauma is known to result in inconsistent 
narratives,73 and there is little grace in “catching” a victim who first claimed an 
assault occurred at 7:00 p.m., then later testified it was at 7:30 p.m. But a board 
adequately trained in the nature of the harms they are tasked with reviewing 
should be able to parse which inconsistencies are meaningful and which are 
not. And, of course, full access to records may also help complainants just as 
much as they help respondents. OCR guidance, then, provides victims and 
students accused of gender violence important rights unavailable to their 
peers. 
Appellate Review
In 1985, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a]lthough schools may wish to provide 
appellate mechanisms to cure procedural errors that can creep into initial 
suspension proceedings, they are not required to do so by the Constitution. 
Due process need only be provided once.”74 Since then, courts have generally 
agreed that students at public schools generally do not have a right to appeal 
“a school’s decision that was reached through constitutional procedures”75 
72. University of Michigan Policy & Procedures on Student Sexual & Gender-Based Misconduct & Other 
Forms of Interpersonal Violence, Investigations Findings and Outcome Notification, UniV. of mich., 
http://studentsexualmisconductpolicy.umich.edu/investigation-findings-and-outcome-
notification (last visited May 26, 2017).
73. Amanda Taub, The Lesson of Rolling Stone and UVA: Protecting Victims Means Checking Their 
Stories, VoX.com (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/12/5/7341973/
trauma-rape-allegation-uva.
74. Brewer by Dreyfus v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. Flaim, 418 F.3d at 636. The court in Flaim notes, though, that many schools “do wisely and 
justly provide for such appeals to all who are charged in a college or university setting.” Id.
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(students at private colleges, of course, have a right to appeal only if promised 
by the school, as a matter of contract). However, OCR suggests that schools go 
beyond the constitutional basement and create an internal appeals process76 to 
review both the finding of responsibility and severity of the sanction, if any.77 
Like all procedural rights, the opportunity should be equally available to both 
complainants and respondents.78  
Broadening the Tent
The above-mentioned reforms promote fair process at public schools 
beyond the bare constitutional requirements. Yet the change is more dramatic 
at private schools, where the Constitution provides no protection to accused 
students. Title IX and Campus SaVE, thus, extend for the first time in federal 
law a basic fair-process mandate to all private universities that receive any 
federal assistance, not just those public schools subject to constitutional due-
process requirements.79 
Mutual Reinforcement of Rights
Perhaps most importantly, campus gender violence laws’ requirement 
of equitable procedural rights makes robust protections for both sides an 
inevitable consequence of protecting victims. Title IX and the Campus 
Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights80 require that peer complainants and 
respondents be provided the same procedural rights.81 Thus the OCR, tasked 
76. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6.
77. QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX, supra note 3, at 44. The Campus SaVE Act requires 
that schools provide notice of any appeals procedure, but does not require that those 
procedures exist. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 
§ 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89 (2013) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2016)).
78. QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX, supra note 3, at 44.
79. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (codified as amended 
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2017)); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 
Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 304, 127 Stat. 54, 89 (2013) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) 
(2016)).
80. “The accuser and the accused are entitled to the same opportunities to have others present 
during any institutional disciplinary proceeding.” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(8)(B)(iv)(II) (2017).
81. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 11 (“Throughout a school’s Title IX investigation, 
including at any hearing, the parties must have an equal opportunity to present relevant 
witnesses and other evidence. The complainant and the alleged perpetrator must be 
afforded similar and timely access to any information that will be used at the hearing.”). The 
Department of Education responded to comments to the associated proposed regulations to 
offer an appeals process for gender violence disciplinary claims, but concluded it lacked the 
authority to do so. Supplementary Information to Final Regulation 34 C.F.R. Part 668, 79 
Fed. Reg. 62775 (Oct. 20, 2014) (responding to public comments to “Definition of ‘Prompt, 
Fair, and Impartial”). See also Foundation for Individual Rights in Education, FIRE Letter to 
Office for Civil Rights Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter FIRE 
Letter], https://www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-office-for-civil-rights-assistant-secretary-for-civil-
rights-russlynn-ali-may-5-2011/ (“FIRE welcomes OCR’s specific and explicit emphasis 
on the necessity of equal treatment for both the complainant and the accused student 
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with enforcing Title IX and clarifying schools’ responsibilities through 
regular guidance, provides more robust rights to one party each time a college 
provides more robust rights to the other, whether at OCR’s behest or on its 
own initiative. Protections for student survivors and accused students, then, 
are not in intractable conflict but mutually reinforcing. For example, as some 
schools have permitted victims’ lawyers to participate actively in disciplinary 
hearings, they have been required by Title IX guidance to provide the same 
support for accused students.82 Rather than seeing Title IX as a threat to 
students’ procedural rights, then, advocates should see the law as a model for 
equitable, sensible disciplinary processes.
Exceptions to the Rising Tide?
While the tide is rising, some students at a small handful of elite universities83 
that provided particularly robust protections for accused students will not 
benefit as do their peers across the country as their schools now are forced to 
adopt more equitable standards. 
Most controversially, a distinct minority of schools previously required clear 
and convincing evidence to find responsibility for gender violence—often for 
gender violence cases alone.84 In its 2011 Dear Colleague Letter, OCR clarified 
with regard to many aspects of the hearing process, including but not limited to access 
to information to be used in the hearing, access to counsel and participation of counsel, 
the ability to review the other party’s statements, access to pre-hearing meetings, and equal 
opportunities to present witnesses and evidence.”). 
82. The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter provides that “[w]hile OCR does not require schools 
to permit parties to have lawyers at any stage of the proceedings, if a school chooses to 
allow the parties to have their lawyers participate in the proceedings, it must do so equally 
for both parties.” Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 12. Similarly, the 2014 Q&A 
explains: “If the school permits one party to have lawyers or other advisors at any stage of 
the proceedings, it must do so equally for both parties. Any school-imposed restrictions on 
the ability of lawyers or other advisors to speak or otherwise participate in the proceedings 
must also apply equally.” QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX, supra note 3, at 26. For 
an example of such a program, see Swarthmore college SeXUal haraSSment/aSSaUlt 
reSoUrceS & eDUcation, proceDUreS for reSolUtion of complaintS againSt StUDentS, 
http://www.swarthmore.edu/share/procedures-resolution-complaints-against-students 
(“The complainant and respondent have the option to be assisted by an adviser of their 
choice…If the adviser is an attorney or other retained person, the adviser must be retained 
at the initiative and expense of the complainant/respondent.”).
83. Deborah L. Brake, Fighting the Rape Culture Wars Through the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard, 
78 mont. l. reV. 109, 147-48 (2017) (noting that elite schools were most likely to use an 
evidentiary standard higher than the preponderance of the evidence before the Dear 
Colleague Letter).
84. For example, Cornell, Stanford, University of Virginia, Yale, Harvard and Princeton all 
had higher standards of proof than preponderance but all changed to the OCR level 
post-2011, with Princeton the last in September 2014. Jake New, Burden of Proof in the Balance, 
inSiDe higher eD (Dec. 16, 2016). See also Title IX & the Preponderance of the Evidence: A White 
Paper (Aug. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Title IX White Paper],  https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3006873/Title-IX-Preponderance-White-Paper-Signed-8-7-16.pdf (“The only 
OCR investigations we have found documenting schools applying a higher standard have 
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that the appropriate standard is preponderance of the evidence,85 the standard 
it had previously required investigated colleges to adopt to avoid findings of 
noncompliance with Title IX.86 Certainly an accused student who would have 
been found not responsible under his or her school’s old clear and convincing 
standard but was instead found responsible under a new preponderance 
standard does not benefit from the new regime. Yet such students are hard to 
come by, and not merely because of the difficulty of proving the counterfactual. 
A number of studies demonstrate that the vast majority of schools used the 
preponderance standard for all disciplinary proceedings, gender-based or not, 
before the Dear Colleague Letter.87 
Similarly, some schools previously allowed students accused of gender 
violence to directly cross-examine their alleged victims, a practice discouraged 
by OCR to avoid unnecessarily retraumatizing survivors.88 Courts have 
occasionally provided public school students accused of serious disciplinary 
infractions with the right to challenge witnesses’s accounts in some manner but 
no absolute right to direct, in-person cross-examination. Goss left the question 
open, refusing to require confrontation and cross-examination for short-term 
suspensions but leaving open the possibility that administrators might permit 
been in cases involving sexual harassment.”).
85. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 11 (“in order for a school’s grievance procedures 
to be consistent with Title IX standards, the school must use a preponderance of the 
evidence standard….”).
86. Letter from Howard Kallem, Chief Attorney, D.C. Enforcement Office, Office for 
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Ms. Jane E. Genster, Vice President and General 
Counsel, Georgetown Univ. (Oct. 16, 2003), https://www.ncherm.org/documents/202-
GeorgetownUniversity--110302017Genster.pdf (“federal courts, and therefore OCR, use 
a preponderance of the evidence standard in resolving allegations of discrimination 
under all of our statutes, including Title IX.”); Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Reg’l Civil 
Rights Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Jane Jervis, President, The 
Evergreen State Coll. at 8 (Apr. 4, 1995), https://www.ncherm.org/documents/193-
EvergreenStateCollege10922064.pdf (“The evidentiary standard of proof applied to Title 
IX actions is that of a ‘preponderance of the evidence’”).
87. Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 yale l.J. 
1940, 1986-88 (2016) [hereinafter Anderson, Campus Sexual]; Standard of Evidence Survey: Colleges 
and Universities Respond to OCR’s New Mandate Appendix, foUnD. inDiViDUal rtS. eDUc. (Oct. 28, 
2013), https://www.thefire.org/fire_speech-codes/student-code-of-conduct-05-06-14/8d799c
c3bcca596e58e0c2998e6b2ce4-pdf/; Angela F. Amar, et al., Administrators’ Perceptions of College 
Campus Protocols, Response, and Student Prevention Efforts for Campus Sexual Assault, 29 Violence & 
VictimS 579, 584-85 (2014); Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. l. reV. 
945, 1000 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson, The Legacy]; Heather M. Karjane et al., Campus 
Sexual Assault: How America’s Institutions of Higher Education Respond, 122 tbl.6.12 (2002), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/196676.pdf; Title IX White Paper, supra note 84, at 7-8 
(summarizing studies of standard of proof used in student discipline).
88. Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 6, at 12 (“OCR strongly discourages schools from 
allowing the parties personally to question or cross-examine each other during the hearing. 
Allowing an alleged perpetrator to question an alleged victim directly may be traumatic or 
intimidating, thereby possibly escalating or perpetuating a hostile environment.”).
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more extensive procedures for students facing very serious sanctions.89 Many 
lower courts, including the Second,90 Fifth,91 Sixth,92 and Eleventh Circuits,93 
have found no right to direct cross-examination, often basing their opinions 
on the “cost and administrative burden”94 of such procedures. Some district 
and state courts, though, have affirmed a limited right, most coherently rooted 
in Goss95 or state laws.96 
Despite its inconsistencies, the case law reminds us that the right to confront 
and cross-examine does not need to be affirmed or denied in absolute terms. 
In Gorman v. Univ. of Rhode Island, the First Circuit considered the complaint 
of a student who had been allowed some cross-examination but was denied 
the ability to “cross-examin[e] any participant in the actions concerning 
possible bias.”97 The court rejected the student’s claim because “the right to 
unlimited cross-examination has not been deemed an essential requirement of 
due process in school disciplinary cases.”98 Some right to confrontation, then, 
89. Goss, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84.
90. Winnick v. Manning, 460 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1972).
91. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir. 1961).
92. Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 641 (6th Cir. 2005); Newsome v. Batavia Local 
Sch. Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1988).
93. Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987).
94. Whiteside v. Kay, 446 F. Supp. 716, 720 (W.D. La. 1978). 
95. Gomes v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16 (D. Me. 2005); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 
F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (“Goss clearly anticipates that where the student is faced 
with the severe penalty of expulsion he shall have the right to be represented by and through 
counsel, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses.”).
96. Warren Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Wilkinson By & Through Wilkinson, 500 So. 2d 455, 460 (Miss. 
1986); John A. v. San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 654 P.2d 242, 246 (Cal. 1982). For 
further discussion of conflicting lower court precedent on the right to cross-examination, 
see Hogan, supra note 50, at 291-93; Larry Bartlett & James McCullagh, Exclusion from the 
Educational Process in the Public Schools: What Process Is Now Due, 1993 B.y.U. eDUc. & l.J. 1, 41-47 
(1993).
97. Gorman v. Univ. of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). See also Jones v. State Bd. of Ed., 279 F. Supp. 190, 197 (M.D. Tenn. 
1968), aff’d, 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969) (“By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to 
failure to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts 
concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses. 
In such circumstances, a hearing which gives the Board or the administrative authorities of 
the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect 
the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dressed judicial hearing, with the 
right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity 
and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college’s educational 
atmosphere and impracticable to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary 
proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college. In the 
instant case, the student should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an 
oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies. . . . If these rudimentary 
elements of fair play are followed in a case of misconduct of this particular type, we feel that 
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may be allowed without permitting full confrontation, including direct cross-
examination of alleged victims by respondents. For example, the Sixth Circuit 
determined that a public school veterinary student’s due process rights were 
not violated when his school allowed him to submit questions for witnesses 
through a hearing panel but not pose them directly.99 Similarly, in Donahue 
v. Baker, the Northern District of New York reconciled varied holdings and 
interests when it allowed a student accused of sexual assault “to direct questions 
to his accuser through the panel.”100
The procedures discussed in Donahue closely mirror OCR’s suggested course 
of action for sexual misconduct cases, which has been adopted by schools 
including Harvard Law.101 OCR instructs that, “when requested, a school 
should make arrangements so that the complainant and the alleged perpetrator 
do not have to be present in the same room at the same time.”102 But, despite 
its commitment to combating a hostile hearing environment, OCR has also 
recognized the value of cross-examination—and the possibility to preserve this 
function without harming victims. Universities can and should experiment 
with different options, but one outlined by the OCR strikes a delicate balance. 
The 2014 guidance includes the following recommendation:
A school may choose, instead, to allow the parties to submit questions to a 
trained third party (e.g., the hearing panel) to ask the questions on their behalf. 
OCR recommends that the third party screen the questions submitted by the 
parties and only ask those it deems appropriate and relevant to the case.103
In striking a balance between victimized students’ and accused students’ 
rights, OCR and the Clery Act appear to have raised the basement for 
procedural rights for all accused students while lowering the ceiling for such 
protections only at a few schools. The floor may still be too low, but it is rising. 
II.  The roots of the “warring factions” myth
Given Title IX’s benefits for accused students, why is the civil rights law 
characterized by so many as a full-throated attack on procedural fairness? One 
reason is that discussions of campus disciplinary procedures for gender violence 
typically have been marked by “rape exceptionalism,” a belief that claims of 
rape and other forms of gender violence should be treated differently—that 
is, with greater skepticism and procedural protections—than other charged 
the requirements of due process of law will have been fulfilled.”).
99. Nash, 812 F.2d at 663-64.
100. Donohue v. Baker, 976 F. Supp. 136, 147 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
101. HLS Sexual Harassment Resources and Procedure for Students, Harvard Law 
School 3.4.1 (Dec. 2014), https://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2015/07/
HLSTitleIXProcedures150629.pdf.
102. QUeStionS anD anSwerS on title iX, supra note 3, at 30.
103. Id. at 31.
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student disciplinary violations.104 The recent spate of national attention to 
campus gender violence triggered concerns for student due processes in a way 
that national attention to plagiarism, for example, never has.105 Public and 
academic debates about how best to investigate and deliberate about campus 
gender violence reports have approached these questions as entirely novel 
“quasi-criminal” challenges, puzzling why schools are tasked with the project 
of punishment at all, rather than part of a large and old project of student 
discipline. As a result, critics bemoan the failure of campus “rape trials”106 to 
live up to the standards of actual criminal rape trials—thus styling Title IX’s 
protections for victims as fundamentally at odds with expected protections for 
the accused—rather than recognizing the ways the new sexual harassment legal 
regime serves as a rising tide for student disciplinary rights writ large.
Both courts and school disciplinary policies have internalized messages 
from sources as diverse as the Bible and the Model Penal Code that rape is a 
unique crime that requires a unique approach, not only because of the depth 
of the harm but because—so the story goes, despite evidence to the contrary107—
women falsely report rape at uniquely high rates.108 The trope of the woman 
who “cries rape,” whether out of jealousy or spite or shame, is as insidious as 
it is unfounded.109 So, too, is the assumption that gender violence accusations 
are inherently and uniquely ambiguous, the truth of the matter ultimately 
unknowable,110 as though courts were not regularly asked to resolve competing 
claims by opposing parties based on testimony and credibility. 
104. See, e.g., Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 87, at 1000.
105. Contrast Harvard Law professors’ recent criticism of gender violence policies with their 
silence in the face of mass suspensions of undergraduates for plagiarism in 2012. For 
further discussion of the unique attention paid to processes surrounding complaints of 
sexual harassment, in contrast to other forms of harassment, see Katharine K. Baker, Campus 
Misconduct, Sexual Harm and Appropriate Process: The Essential Sexuality of it All, 66 J. legal eDUc. 
777 (2017); Anderson, Campus Sexual, supra note 87, at 1985 (“[T]he Harvard Law professors’ 
objections to the limited process rights of those accused of misconduct are nonunique; that 
is, they could be lodged against the same kinds of procedures associated with allegations of 
campus cheating, hazing, nonsexual assault, arson, or discrimination on the basis of race.”).
106. Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, n.y. timeS (Nov. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.
com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandling-rape.html. 
107. Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 
24 U.c. DaViS l. reV. 1013, 1026 (1991).
108. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 yale l.J. 1087, 1140 (1986) (“[N]o woman is entirely above 
suspicion: ‘Objectivity’ demands that the jury be reminded to view the testimony of every 
victim or complaining witness with the ‘special care’ uniquely required in rape cases.”).
109. See, e.g., Torrey, supra note 107 , at 1025 (cataloging the rape myths that underlie contemporary 
criminal law).
110. See, e.g., Barclay Sutton Hendrix, A Feather on One Side, A Brick on the Other: Tilting the Scale Against 
Males Accused of Sexual Assault in Campus Disciplinary Proceedings, 47 ga. l. reV. 591, 615-16 (2013) 
(claiming rape accusations “nearly always involve a ‘he said, she said’ dispute.”); Stephen 
Henrick, A Hostile Environment for Student Defendants: Title IX and Sexual Assault on College Campuses, 
40 n. ky. l. reV. 49, 66 (2013) (“[T]he evidence of what happened in a typical sexual 
assault case is usually murky and prone to an increased risk of erroneous conviction.”).
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In response to the “special” challenges of gender violence claims, courts 
and schools have placed additional procedural obstacles in the way of alleged 
rape victims that, say, an alleged arson victim simply does not face. For 
example, Harvard previously required rape victims to report the harm within 
an unusually short time frame and provide corroborating evidence, neither of 
which was obligatory for students complaining of other also-criminal violations 
of student conduct codes.111 Today, many critics demand higher burdens of 
evidence for alleged gender-violence victims than for victims of other forms 
of student misconduct112 and advocate for additional procedural protections 
for students accused of sexual assault,113 all because of the supposedly greater 
challenges of gender-violence accusations. Notably absent from the focus of 
their concern are any students accused of “nonsexual” assault or other serious 
student disciplinary charges for conduct that is also criminal, including 
underage drinking, drug sales, and physical violence not based on gender.114
Rape exceptionalism finds a powerful bedrock in the dominance of criminal 
law in conversations about gender violence. Courts have been clear that 
schools need not and indeed should not attempt to recreate the procedural 
protections of a criminal trial,115 and plenty of student conduct violations, 
sexual and nonsexual alike, are also punishable under criminal law. Yet critics 
and legislators treat sexual assault alone as essentially and exclusively criminal. The 
most frequently asked question of the recent national debate about campus 
gender violence is why schools have any role in addressing gender violence—
which, to the public imagination, is a crime and a crime alone, not a civil rights 
111. For a thorough account of the dangers of rape exceptionalism in criminal courts and school 
disciplinary proceedings, including Harvard’s, see Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 87.
112. See, e.g., Editorial Board of the Stanford Review, Dear Betsy: Restore Justice to Title IX, Stan. reV. 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://stanfordreview.org/dear-betsy-restore-justice-to-title-ix-c7c72df7616c#.
uht6fikcu; Hendrix, supra note 110, at 612-15; Henrick, supra note 110; New Federal Regulations 
Limit Due Process, Free Speech Rights on Campus, foUnD. inDiViDUal rtS. eDUc (May 5, 2011), 
https://www.thefire.org/fire-new-federal-regulations-limit-due-process-free-speech-rights-
on-campus/ (“Students accused of serious crimes like rape should not be tried under the 
same standard of proof used for a parking ticket.”). It is worth noting that civil courts do, in 
fact, use the same standard of evidence for rape and automobile violations.
113. Hendrix, supra note 110, at 615-18 (2013) (advocating for the right to cross-examine for 
students accused of gender violence because, among other reasons, rape accusations “nearly 
always involve a ‘he said, she said’ dispute.”). 
114. Id.; Bartholet, supra note 9.
115. E.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 583 (“To impose in each such case even truncated trial-type procedures 
well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost 
more than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the 
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it 
too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching 
process.”); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 664 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that accused 
students’ rights in a disciplinary hearing “are not co-extensive with the rights of litigants 
in a civil trial or with those of defendants in a criminal trial”); Brewer by Dreyfus v. Austin 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 779 F.2d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 1985) (urging parties not to “confuse[] two 
quite distinct processes: school disciplinary actions and criminal sentencing proceedings”).
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violation, tort, or honor code infraction.116 The legal and practical answer is 
simple: Title IX requires schools to respond to gender violence as a form of 
sex discrimination, and schools also have a special interest in ensuring a safe 
community in which students can learn. Yet a frequent refrain from critics and 
legislators with varying political allegiances is that rape is simply too “serious” 
an offense for any response other than criminal prosecution.117 
Seriousness rhetoric may appear to be rooted in concern for victims and the 
grave harms they have experienced. Yet, paradoxically, it easily forms a basis 
for policies directly counter to those students’ interests.118 The most obvious 
of these is mandatory referral laws, the proposed requirements that schools 
turn over all reports of gender violence to the police. These bills have gained 
significant political momentum despite the fact that victims overwhelmingly 
say that, faced with the prospect of their schools forwarding their reports to 
law enforcement, they simply would not report to anyone at all.119 In the face 
of clear, repeated objections by survivors and their advocates, proponents 
have returned repeatedly to the easy, misleading refrain of seriousness: that 
116. See, e.g., Alexandra Brodsky & Elizabeth Deutsch, The Promise of Title IX: Sexual Violence and the 
Law, DiSSent (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/title-ix-activism-sexual-
violence-law (placing school responses to gender violence in context of other civil remedies). 
117. See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Bernie Sanders Comments on Campus Rape, and Totally Drops the Ball, 
hUffington poSt (Jan. 12, 2016, 3:59 pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bernie-
sanders-campus-rape_us_5695431ee4b086bc1cd5616e (quoting then-presidential candidate 
Bernie Sanders saying, “Rape and assault is rape and assault. Whether it takes places on 
campus or on a dark street. And if a student rapes a fellow student, that has got to be 
understood as a very serious crime. It has got to get outside of the school and have a police 
investigation. And it has got to take place. Too many schools are seeing this as ‘well, it’s a 
student issue, let’s deal with it.’ I disagree with that. It is a crime and it has to be treated 
as a serious crime. And you are seeing now the real horror of many women who have been 
assaulted or raped, sitting in a classroom alongside somebody who raped them. Rape is a 
very, very serious crime and it has to be prosecuted.”); Ashe Schow, Congressman’s Office Has 
Perfect Response to Anti-Due Process Advocates, waSh. eXaminer (Nov. 3, 2015, 4:49 pm), http://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/congressmans-office-has-perfect-response-to-anti-due-
process-advocates/article/2575571; Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She Hadn’t, n.y. 
timeS (July 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/13/us/how-one-college-handled-
a-sexual-assault-complaint.html (“[I]nternal records, along with interviews with students, 
sexual-assault experts and college officials, depict a school ill prepared to evaluate an 
allegation so serious that, if proved in a court of law, would be a felony, with a likely prison 
sentence. As the case illustrates, school disciplinary panels are a world unto themselves, 
operating in secret with scant accountability and limited protections for the accuser or the 
accused.”); Rubenfeld, supra note 106; Letter from Scott Berkovitz & Rebecca O’Connor to the White 
House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault, rape, aBUSe & inceSt nat’l network 
(Feb. 28, 2014), at 9, https://www.rainn.org/images/03-2014/WH-Task-Force-RAINN-
Recommendations.pdf (asking the White House to “deemphasize” student disciplinary 
procedures for gender violence and promote criminal prosecution). See also generally Brodsky, 
supra note 45 (tracking “seriousness” rhetoric in attempts to require schools to refer rape 
reports to the police). 
118. Brodsky, supra note 45.
119. Know Your IX, Ask Survivors Survey Results, http://knowyourix.org/ask-survivors/; Brodsky, 
supra note 45.
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the harm is simply too bad for a school intervention, even if the harmed desire 
that remedy.120 
Similarly, the criminal-law-focused rape exceptionalism that underlies 
seriousness rhetoric also leads to challenges to schools’ internal disciplinary 
policies by providing an intuitively appealing, if legally and ethically 
unpersuasive, basis on which to demand that student hearings look like 
criminal trials. Consider the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education’s 
(FIRE’s) 2011 objection to the preponderance standard in a letter to then-
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali: 
Insisting that the preponderance of the evidence standard be used in hearing 
sexual violence claims turns the fundamental tenet of due process on its head, 
requiring that those accused of society’s vilest crimes be afforded the scant 
protection of our judiciary’s least certain standard.121
Even putting aside the substantive debate about the appropriateness of 
the preponderance standard, FIRE’s rhetorical move is remarkable. The 
organization uses the depth of the wrongdoing against victims against those 
same victims, singling sexual assault allegations out for special scrutiny and 
procedural hurdles as though the additional obstacles flowed naturally from 
a seemingly benevolent, arguably feminist,122 first principle: that rape is 
particularly bad.
FIRE replicates this same sleight of hand in its dubious reading of Addington 
v. Texas, to which it cites repeatedly in its 2011 letter to the Department of 
Education advocating for clear and convincing evidence as the appropriate 
standard in sexual harassment disciplinary hearings.123 In Addington, the Supreme 
Court held that at least a “clear and convincing” standard was necessary 
120. See, e.g., Dana Bolger, Paternalistic Delaware Women Lawmakers Fight Campus Rape Survivors on Bill, 
feminiSting.com (Oct. 8, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/10/08/paternalistic-delaware-
women-lawmakers-fight-campus-rape-survivors-on-bill/ (“Often proponents of mandatory 
police referral bills like that in Delaware are blatantly sexist: they believe women as a class 
lie and, accordingly, that rape reports should go to juries, not schools . . . . The concerns 
animating the Delaware women lawmakers’ bill seem of a different flavor. Something far 
more insidious, a paternalism that whispers, I know better than you what you need. I know better 
than you what justice is or should be. I know better than you what will make students safe.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
121. FIRE Letter, supra note 81.
122. For feminist criticisms of exceptionalizing rape as a uniquely devastating harm, see, e.g., 
Charlotte Shane, Live Through This, the new inQUiry (July 26, 2012), http://thenewinquiry.
com/essays/live-through-this/ (“It is unforgivable to publicly question the mythologizing of 
rape’s status as the ruination of all women who go through it.”); Jenny Diski, Diary: Rape-
Rape, 31 lonDon reV. BookS 52 (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n21/jenny-diski/
diary (“I didn’t think that it was the most terrible thing that had ever happened to me. It 
was a very unpleasant experience, it hurt and I was trapped. But I had no sense that I was 
especially violated by the rape itself, not more than I would have been by any attack on my 
person and freedom. In 1961 it didn’t go without saying that to be penetrated against one’s 
will was a kind of spiritual murder.”). 
123. FIRE Letter, supra note 81.
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for civil commitment of a patient to state mental hospital, reversing Texas’s 
highest court.124 The holding fell neatly in step with twentieth-century case 
law on procedural due process in noncriminal proceedings. That line of cases 
makes clear that the “fundamental tenet” of due process is not that the worse 
the accusation, the higher the evidentiary burden, as FIRE claims. Instead, 
procedural protections and standards of evidence must adjust to account for 
the gravity of the legal action’s repercussions, not the gravity of the harm that 
led to the legal action.125 In addition to civil commitment, other noncriminal 
proceedings in which “clear and convincing” or its close variants are necessary 
to protect significant liberty interests include deportation proceedings,126 
denaturalization proceedings,127 and parental rights termination proceedings.128
The Addington holding does not help opponents of the preponderance in 
student discipline. However grave a deprivation suspension or expulsion may 
be, removal from school does not rival forcible imprisonment, even if the 
imprisonment is technically not punitive.129 Nor does this line of cases support 
FIRE’s argument that the reputational harm of a finding of responsibility for 
rape necessitates a higher burden of proof.130 O.J. Simpson was found liable 
for Nicole Brown’s death in civil court based on the preponderance of the 
evidence; a higher standard was not necessary even though the alleged conduct 
was also, without a doubt, one of “society’s vilest crimes,” with a finding of 
liability sure to create a reputational injury.131 
In truth, FIRE’s strategy depends not on legal reasoning but on the reader’s 
intuition toward rape exceptionalism. Repeatedly, the letter cites to Addington 
dicta, noting that in state courts that the standard may be employed “‘in civil 
cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing 
124. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
125. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also, infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
126. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276, 284-86 (1966).
127. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 123 (1943).
128. Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).
129. Motion of Amici Curiae Equal Rights Advocates et al., Neal v. Colorado State Univ.-Pueblo, 
No. 1:16-CV-00873-RM-CBS, Ex. A at 21 (D. Colo. 2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/07/Neal-v-CSU-Amicus-Brief.pdf.  
130. FIRE Letter, supra note 81 (“In the educational context, the Supreme Court has further held 
that when ‘a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of 
what the government is doing to him,’ due process requires ‘precautions against unfair or 
mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.’ The Court made 
these observations about due process protections at the elementary and secondary school 
level, finding at least minimal requirements of due process necessary because disciplinary 
action ‘could seriously damage the students’ standing with their fellow pupils and their 
teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment.’ 
Given the increased likelihood of much further-reaching negative consequences for a 
college student found guilty of sexual harassment or sexual violence in a campus judicial 
proceeding, greater protections are required, not lesser.” (internal citations omitted)). 
131. Simpson, et al. v. Brown, CA 4, No. G021264.
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by the defendant.’”132 The Addington language is less than clear: The Court 
itself provides no citations for its assertions, and the history of heightened 
standards for fraud is murky.133 What is clear, though, is that—despite the 
Court’s misleading singling out of “quasi-criminal wrongdoing”134—what makes 
a proceeding “quasi-criminal” is not the nature of the wrongdoing but the 
potential outcomes: Clear and convincing evidence of intent is usually necessary 
for punitive damages for fraud, not for a mere finding of responsibility.135 
Yet FIRE elides the actual content of the “quasi-criminal” label in its attack 
on the preponderance standard. The letter reads, in part:
In determining compliance, OCR is engaged in a matter of administrative 
review; at stake is federal funding, not an individual’s continued matriculation, 
reputation, and employment prospects. As such, OCR’s own use of a 
lower standard of evidence may be justified. In contrast, when determining 
whether a student has in fact committed sexual harassment or sexual violence 
against another student, the college or university judicial body conducting 
the proceeding is engaged in precisely the “quasi-criminal” adjudication for 
which the Supreme Court has deemed the “clear and convincing” standard to 
be appropriate. The stakes for the accused are extremely high; the permanent, 
severely negative consequences of a guilty finding will follow the student for 
the rest of his or her life. As a result, a campus judicial hearing charged with 
deciding between guilt or innocence much more closely resembles a criminal 
proceeding than OCR’s determinations of institutional compliance.136
Taking as true that a student’s finding of responsibility by a student 
disciplinary board is more personally devastating than a school’s finding of 
noncompliance by the federal government—despite what some university 
administrators might protest—the legal conclusion FIRE seeks to draw from 
this distinction is dispelled by a quick look at the state of civil actions today. If 
a young person is sued in court under tort law for gender violence, the plaintiff 
will bear the burden to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the tort 
occurred (just as, remember, Nicole Brown’s estate did). If that same plaintiff 
sues a school for failure to fulfill its Title IX responsibilities, the same standard 
must be met. The fact that one charge may carry greater reputational damage 
very obviously does not transform it into a “quasi-criminal” proceeding in the 
eyes of the law, as the term is used in Addington and elsewhere.
132. FIRE Letter, supra note 81 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424-25). 
133. In a 2000 article, John Rosenthal and Robert Alter argue that the higher burden for fraud 
is a historical accident, a result of competition between common-law courts of law and of 
equity. John Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T. Alter, Clear and Convincing To Whom? The False 
Claims Act and its Burden Of Proof Standard: Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 74 notre Dame l. 
reV. 1409, 1432-45 (2000).
134. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added).
135. Justice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to 
Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ala. l. reV. 61, 88 (1993); Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Standard of proof as 
to Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage Awards—Modern Status, 58 A.L.R.4th 878 (1987).
136. FIRE Letter, supra note 81 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 424) (citations omitted).
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Despite its flimsiness, FIRE’s legal argument is politically effective because 
the “quasi-criminal” label appeals to readers’ rape-exceptionalist instincts, 
disconnected from the term’s technical meaning. Whatever “quasi-criminal” 
means in Addington, the idea that a student disciplinary hearing to determine a 
finding of responsibility (which is all that will be found, not guilt or innocence, 
as the FIRE letter claims) for sexual assault is “quasi-criminal” is intuitively 
clear to anyone who believes that sexual assault itself is inherently, essentially, 
criminal. FIRE’s reliance on the “quasi-criminal” mislabel, then, does the same 
work as Jed Rubenfeld’s description of these same hearings as “rape trials.”137 
Both terms harness rape exceptionalism to project criminal stakes onto school 
disciplinary proceedings and then demand criminal-like protections.
If the point of reference is actual rape trials, then, rather than disciplinary 
hearings for nonsexual offenses, it is little surprise that critics see recent Title 
IX guidance and the Campus SaVE amendments to VAWA as attacks on 
fair process rather than enhancements. But the student discipline case law 
fits within a larger transubstantive body of procedural due process law that 
recognizes that “fair” does not necessarily mean “criminal.” Civil trials, as 
discussed above, deviate widely from the stricter requirements of their criminal 
counterparts. Perhaps more relevantly, administrative law makes clear that 
the determinations of resource-strapped agencies must be fair but “need not 
take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial trial” to do so.138 Flexible, context-
dependent procedures are dictated by the instruction of the Court in Mathews 
v. Eldridge that any determination of “what process is due”139 requires a careful 
weighing of disparate interests, including consideration of the adjudicating 
institution’s limited resources, the private parties’ stakes, and the public 
interest. Government agencies and colleges alike, then, must ensure healthy 
protections in their decision-making, but also must avoid overly burdensome 
procedures that interfere with the entity’s central purpose. All who develop 
campus disciplinary policies must constantly struggle to achieve a careful 
balance between the parties’ competing interests and the core institutional 
interest in promoting education. 
III.  What students lose
Increased procedural burdens resulting from myopic focus on sexual 
misconduct discipline pose an obvious harm to victims. Unique scrutiny also 
leads to more-drawn-out campus procedures and further litigation, leaving 
victims in limbo. But survivors are not the only ones to benefit from a more 
expansive conversation that puts the Title IX debate in the larger context of 
student discipline. Expanding the conversation to other disciplinary harms 
will also—and this should excite due-process defenders—create space to extend 
protections to students accused of nonsexual harms. Title IX can be a tide 
137. Rubenfeld, supra note 106.
138. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970).
139. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
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that lifts all boats if schools create transsubstantive disciplinary rules that 
expand OCR’s protections for students accused of sexual assault to students 
accused of all harms, from robbing a roommate, to dealing drugs in the dorm, 
to punching a teammate in the face.140 
In part, the promise of Title IX is simply one of policy. Remember: Other 
accused students currently have fewer procedural rights under federal law than the 
classmate accused of rape. What if all students facing disciplinary action were 
guaranteed the same fair processes? Viewing the situation as an opportunity 
rather than a crisis, advocates can seize upon current Title IX debates as a 
forum to develop shared procedural policies much needed in the shadow of 
weak constitutional protections. 
The power of Title IX for fair process is also expressive. What if educators 
and advocates approached all threats to all students’ access to education with 
Title IX’s commitment to learning as central to dignity and public citizenship? 
One powerful step toward that end would be to use the significant national 
attention paid to the contentious public Title IX debate to discuss the needs 
of students accused of nonsexual harms, not only in higher education but 
also K-12 schools, where data make clear young people of color are excluded 
from their classrooms at inexcusable rates.141 Media coverage of these known 
obstacles to educational opportunity and racial equality is scarce compared to 
the ill-informed circus of debate on Title IX. What if we could do better? I 
think we can.
Conclusion: A better way forward
To put it bluntly, the past five years of debate around campus sexual 
assault have been marked by a wrongheaded and counterproductive battle 
over supposedly irreconcilable differences. At this time of grave threats to 
civil rights, it is particularly important that we change how we talk about 
violence and procedural fairness in schools. Without a doubt, we are tasked 
with difficult, highly technical questions, to which law provides only a rough 
outline of an answer. But we will better serve students if our conversations 
consistently remember their context: the broader struggle for civil rights in 
schools. Doing so will make legible values shared by all those who seek to 
defend young people’s opportunities to learn. Context will also be crucial 
to resist the dangerous effects of rape exceptionalism, reminding victims’ 
advocates of their commitments to fair process in other disputes, providing 
well-meaning advocates for the accused with guidance, and depriving the 
disingenuous of the spoils of their misleading campaigns.
140. None of this is to say that schools cannot recognize special sensitivities, acknowledging, for 
example, the difference between a student accused of stealing a textbook cross-examining 
the accuser and a student accused of rape cross-examining the alleged victim, and designing 
policies accordingly. Indeed, criminal procedure does so.
141. U.S. Dept. of Ed., Civil Rights Data Collection Data Snapshot: School Discipline, office 
for ciVil rightS (March 2014), http://ocrdata.ed.gov/downloads/crdc-school-discipline-
snapshot.pdf.
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One practical way to put those commitments into action is to focus our 
institutional design energies on transsubstantive disciplinary procedures that 
handle all student misconduct, including but not limited to gender violence.142 
Doing so would ensure that all students—on either side of the table, no matter 
the issue—are treated fairly without assigning special obstacles to sexual 
assault victims. Reform efforts would benefit all students. Fewer would be 
unjustly deprived of the opportunity to learn. And on that goal, all advocates 
and educators can agree.
142. The VAWA amendments to the Clery Act require that disciplinary hearings “be conducted 
by officials who receive annual training on the issues related to domestic violence, dating 
violence, sexual assault, and stalking and how to conduct an investigation and hearing 
process that protects the safety of victims and promotes accountability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)
(8)(B)(iv)(I)(bb) (2017). The OCR requires that “[a]ll persons involved in implementing a 
recipient’s grievance procedures (e.g., Title IX coordinators, investigators, and adjudicators) 
must have training or experience in handling complaints of sexual harassment and sexual 
violence, and in the recipient’s grievance procedures.” Dear colleagUe letter, supra note 
6, at 12. To reconcile the need for specialized training with the advantages of a centralized 
disciplinary board, schools could create a single committee staffed by a group of professors 
and administrators who are assigned to cases based on their training.
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